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Abstract— Data mining and knowledge discovery are two 
important growing research fields in the last two decades due 
to the abundance of data collected from various sources. The 
exponentially growing volumes of generated data urge the 
development of several mining techniques to feed the needs for 
automatically derived knowledge. Clustering analysis (finding 
similar groups of data) is a well-established and widely used 
approach in data mining and knowledge discovery. In this 
paper, we introduce a clustering technique that uses game 
theory models to tackle multi-objective application problems. 
The main idea is to exploit a specific type of simultaneous move 
games, called congestion games. Congestion games offer 
numerous advantages ranging from being succinctly 
represented to possessing Nash equilibrium that is reachable in 
a polynomial-time. The proposed algorithm has three main 
steps: 1) it starts by identifying the initial players (or the 
cluster-heads); 2) then, it establishes the initial clusters’ 
composition by constructing the game and try to find the 
equilibrium of the game. The third step consists of merging 
close clusters to obtain the final clusters. The experimental 
results show that the proposed clustering approach obtains 
good results and it is very promising in terms of scalability and 
performance. 
Keywords— Data mining, data analysis, clustering, game 
theory, simultaneous-move games, Nash equilibrium. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Data science is one of the most growing research fields 
over the last few years. It refers to an empirical approach that 
uses the available big amounts of data to provide answers to 
a wide variety of questions and problems that human beings 
are enable to treat without the intervention of computers [1]. 
Among the several methods and techniques used in data 
science, cluster analysis (clustering) is a well-established and 
widely used technique. It is the process of grouping the data 
into classes or clusters, in such a way that objects in the same 
cluster are very similar and objects in different clusters are 
different.  
Game theory offers very attractive rigorous mathematical 
tools for modelling and resolving various strategic situations; 
thus, it is increasingly used to resolve a wide range of 
problems. 
Game theory-based clustering algorithms are not 
numerous, and only a few of them do reach the Nash 
equilibrium in a polynomial time. This is due to the high 
complexity of finding solution concepts, such as Nash 
equilibrium [2]. There are many other types of clustering 
algorithms based on various methodologies and concepts 
(see [3][4], [5] , for more details).  
In this paper, we propose a multi-objective clustering 
algorithm based on game theory using parallel games. It is 
called MOCA-SM (Multi-Objective Clustering Algorithm 
based on Simultaneous-Move games). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 
2, we give an overview of Game Theory and its basic 
concepts. In section 3 we present the proposed clustering 
approach. In Section 4 we provide experimental results and 
discussion. In Section 5 we conclude and give some future 
directions and perspectives of this research work. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In this section, we first introduce the game theory, then, 
we present the subclass of games used in this work, which is 
called Singleton Congestion games with player-specific 
payoff functions. 
A. Parallel Games  
In game theory, the term “game” means an abstract 
mathematical model of a multi-agent decision-making 
setting[6]. Formally, it is represented by a tuple (N, S, u) 
[7], where 
 N = {1, …, n} is a set of players, indexed by i; 
 S = S1*…*Sn, and Si is a finite set of strategies 
available to player i. Each vector s = (s1, …, sn)  S is 
called a strategy profile; 
 u = (u1, …, un), and ui: SR is a real-valued utility 
(or payoff) function for player i. 
The normal form, also known as the strategic or matrix 
form is when we represent a game via an n-dimensional 
matrix. Simultaneous-move (parallel) games [8] are when all 
players take their decisions at the same time, consequently, 
they do not know the decisions made by the other players. 
B. Solution Concepts and Nash Equilibrium 
Reasoning about multi-player games is based on solution 
concepts, which are principals that help us to identify 
interesting subsets of the outcomes of a game [7]. One of the 
most powerful solution concepts in game theory is Nash 
equilibrium.  
To define Nash equilibrium [2], we need to define the 
notion of best response [7]. Formally, we denote s−i = (s1, ..., 
si−1, si+1, ..., sn), a strategy profile s without player i’s 
strategy. Thus, we can write s = (si, s−i). If the agents other 
than i (whom we denote −i) were to commit to playing s−i, a 
utility-maximizing agent i would face the problem of 
determining their best response.  
Definition 1 (Best response) [7]: Player i’s best response to 
the strategy profile s−i is a mixed strategy s∗i ∈ Si such that ui 
(s∗i, s−i ) ≥ ui (si , s−i ) for all strategies si ∈ Si . 
The best response is not necessarily unique. Thus, the notion 
of “best response” is not a solution concept; it does not 
identify an interesting set of outcomes in this general case 
[7].  
Definition 2 (Nash equilibrium) [2]: A strategy profile s = 
(s1,..., sn) is a Nash equilibrium if si is a best response to s−i 
for all agents i. 
Nash equilibrium is a simple but powerful principle for 
reasoning about behavior in general games [2]: even when 
there is no dominant strategy, we should expect players to 
use strategies that give the best responses to each other [9]. 
This is the most used solution concept in game theory, 
nevertheless, it is established that computing Nash 
equilibrium is hard for many games’ subclasses [10]–[13]. 
C. Singleton Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff 
Functions  
In 1996 Milchtaich introduced a subclass of congestion 
games which were presented by Rosenthal in [14] [15]. In 
this subclass, the payoff function associated with each 
resource is not universal but a player specific. And it is 
assumed that each player chooses only one primary resource 
and that the actual payoff received decreases (not 
necessarily strictly decreasing) with the number of other 
players who selected the same resource. Consequently, the 
cost of a resource e for player i does not depend only on the 
number of players that chose it, but it depends also on the 
player himself. Hence, every player i has their cost function 
cie for every resource e, hence the introduction of the 
definition below. 
Definition 3 (SCGPSC: Singleton congestion game with 
player-specific cost [14]) is a tuple (N, E, S, (cie)iN, eE), 
where 
 N = {1, …, n} is a set of players, indexed by i. 
 E = {1, …, m} is a set of resources, indexed by e. 
 Strategy set S: S1×…×Sn, where Si is a set of 
strategies available to player i and strategy si  Si 
is a singleton; a set with exactly one element. 
 Cost function cie(ne) R for player i and resource 
e, where cie(𝑛𝑒)  ci’e(𝑛𝑒) if (i, i’) N×N, i.e. the 
cost function depends on the player himself and 
on the number of players that select the resource 
e. 
Where:  𝑛𝑒 = |{i  : e = si }|, and (n1, n2, …, nm) is called the 
congestion vector corresponding to a strategy s = (s1, s2, …, 
sn). 
This class of congestion games will be used in our 
approach to model and resolve the clustering problem. 
Nash Equilibrium in SCGPSC 
Malchtaich proved that this sub-class of congestion games 
does not generally admit a potential [15], so, it does not 
always converge to Nash equilibrium as it may be cyclic.  
However, Matchtaich proved that SCGPSC possess always 
a Nash equilibrium. He used the proof by induction on the 
number n of players, where it is supposed that an instance of 
the game with n-1 players has a Nash equilibrium then the 
game with n players has also a Nash equilibrium. For the 
complete proof see [14]. This proof is constructive and 
implicitly describes an efficient algorithm for finding an 
equilibrium for a given n-player SCGPSC game, by adding 
one player after the other in at most (
𝑛 + 1
2
) steps [14]. 
III. PROPOSED APPROACH  
Our main contribution is the design of a multi-objective 
clustering algorithm based on game theory with parallel (or 
simultaneous move) games. We use the class of non-
cooperative simultaneous-move game presented above; 
called Singleton Congestion game with Player-Specific Cost 
(SCGPSC), to model the clustering problem, where the 
players are part of the initial dataset, the resources are the 
rest of the dataset, and the cost function is an optimisation 
function of two conflicting objectives: connectedness and 
separation. 
A. Optimisation Objectives 
The main goal is to optimise a problem that consists of 
two conflicting optimisation objectives, the first is R-Square, 
and the other is the connectivity of the clusters based on the 
Euclidean distance. The combination of those two objectives 
was first used by Heloulou et al.  [16] in a clustering 
algorithm that uses sequential game theory. R-Square [17], 
[18] is optimal when the number of clusters is high and the 
connectivity of clusters is optimal when the number of 
clusters is low, so, the compromise of those two conflicting 
objectives guarantees a good quality clustering according to 
the experiments presented in [16].   
R-square is given by the formula: 
𝑅2(𝐶) =
𝐼𝑅(𝐶)
𝐼𝐴 (𝐶)+𝐼𝑅(𝐶) 
         
Where 𝐼𝑅(𝐶) is inter-cluster inertia which measures the 
separation of the clusters [19]:  
𝐼𝑅(𝐶) =
1
𝑛
∑  |𝐶𝑖|
𝐾
𝑖=1 ∗ 𝑑
2(𝑐ℎ𝑖, 𝑔),       (2) 
Where chi is the cluster-head of Ci, g = (g1, ..., gm ) and gj 
is the gravity centre of the dataset along the j
th
 dimension. 
𝑔𝑗 =
1
𝑛
 ∑ 𝑜𝑖𝑗 .
𝑛
𝑖=1
        (3) 
𝐼𝐴(𝐶) is the intra-cluster inertia which should be as weak 
as possible to have a set of homogeneous clusters. It is given 
as [19]: 
𝐼𝐴(𝐶) =  
1
𝑛
  ∑ ∑ 𝑑2(𝜔, 𝑐ℎ𝑖)𝜔𝜖𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑖𝜖𝐶 .     (4) 
Where: chi is the cluster-head of the cluster Ci. 
The connectivity measure is intended to assign similar 
data to the same cluster. It is given by the formula:  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐(𝐶) = ∑
|𝐶𝑖|
𝑛
𝐾
𝑖=1 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐(𝐶𝑖),     (5) 
Where 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐(𝐶𝑖) is the connectivity of the cluster Ci, 
and it is given by 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐(𝐶𝑖) =  
1
|𝐶𝑖|
 ∑
∑ 𝜒ℎ,𝑛𝑛ℎ𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
𝐿
|𝐶𝑖|
ℎ=1  ,         (6) 
Where  
𝜒𝑟,𝑠 =  {
1, 𝑖𝑓  𝑟, 𝑠 𝜖 𝐶𝑖  
0,         𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
 
nnhj is the j
th nearest neighbour of object h, and L is a 
parameter indicating the number of neighbours that 
contribute to the connectivity measure. The connectivity 
value should be maximised. Heloulou et al. [16] have 
defined the product 𝜑(𝐶) that combines the two objectives 
and should be maximised: 
𝜑(𝐶) = 𝑅2(𝐶) ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑐(𝐶)           (7) 
B. The Model 
We model the clustering problem as a single-act 
nonzero-sum multi-player singleton congestion game with 
player-specific cost function. Hence, the game G is defined 
by the tuple:   
𝑮 = (𝑵, 𝑬, (𝑿𝒌)𝒌∈𝑵, (𝒄𝒐𝒆𝒌)𝒆∈𝑬,𝒌∈𝑵 )        (8) 
Where 
𝑵 =  {  𝑐ℎ 𝑖| 𝑐ℎ𝑖 =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑘:𝑜𝑘∈𝑂𝑖
𝑑𝑚(𝑜𝑘),   
            𝑂𝑖 = 𝑂𝑖−1\{𝑐ℎ𝑖−1, 𝑜𝑗 | 𝑑𝑖𝑠[𝑗][𝑐ℎ𝑖−1] <  
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑛0
},                  
𝑖 =  0. . 𝑛0 − 1, 𝑗 = 0. . |𝑂𝑖−1| }  
Where: N is the set of players, i.e. objects with more density 
around them, dm is the dissimilarity of an object, Dmax is 
the maximum distance between two objects in the dataset, 
and n0 is the initial number of players. 
𝑬 =  {𝑜 ∶ 𝑜 ∈ O\N} 
𝑿𝒌 = {{𝑜}| 𝑜 ∈ 𝐸}, 𝑘 = 0. . |N| − 1; 
𝒄𝒐𝒆𝒌(𝒏𝒆)
=  {
− (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐(𝐶𝑘
(𝑡)) ∗ 𝑅2(𝐶(𝑡))) , 𝑘 = 0. . |N| − 1 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑒 = 1 
∞   , 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑒 > 1
 
,   e ∈ E,   𝑛𝑒 =  |{𝑧: 𝑒 = 𝑥𝑧}| 
And the payoff of player k for strategy profile x is 
negative cost: 
𝑢𝑘(𝑥) =  −𝑐𝑜𝑘(𝑥) 
C. Model Implementation 
In this section, we explain in detail our approach of 
clustering and we present our new algorithm of multi-
objective clustering; called MOCA-SM.  
MOCA-SM consists of three main steps; the first step 
consists of the identification of the players of the MOCA-
SM game. The second step is the identification of the 
composition of the initial clusters. The third step is the 
refinement of the final clusters by merging the clusters 
resulted from the previous step. This is summarised in 
Algorithm 1. 
 
Algorithm 1: MOCA-SM 
Inputs: Dataset O={𝑜0, 𝑜1, … , 𝑜𝑚−1}, number of final 
clusters f 
Outputs: set of clusters  
 
1: t←0 
2: compute distance matrix DIS between all objects of 
O 
3: Algorithm 2: Identification of initial players, the 
set ch  
4: repeat  
5:       t←t+1 
6:       Algorithm 3: construct the game in formula (8) 
7:       Algorithm 4: compute Nash equilibrium 
8:       for each player  
9:              if Nash equilibrium enhance the clustering 
then       
10:                     Allocate the Nash equilibrium strategy 
for player 
11:             else 
12:                     Player out of game 
13:             end if 
14:       end for 
15:  until (O is empty, or all players are out of the 
game)  
16: Algorithm 5: Merge the resulted clusters    
17: assign the left objects to the closest cluster   
 
 
  Algorithm 2: Identification of initial players 
Inputs: Dataset O={𝑜0, 𝑜1, … , 𝑜𝑚−1} 
Outputs: Set ch of initial cluster-heads (players) ch={ch1, 
ch2, …, chk }  
 
1: compute n0, the initial number of players using 
formula (9) 
2: compute dissimilarity of each object oi of O: dm(oi) 
using formula (10) 
3: O’← O 
4: repeat  
5:       Compute the object ox with the most density 
around in O’ 
6:       Add ox to ch 
7:       Eliminate ox from the O’ 
8:       Eliminate close objects to ox from the O’ 
9: until (O’ is empty or |ch| = n0)  
 
Algorithm 3: Formulation of the game  
Inputs: players ch = {ch1, ch2, …, chk }, dataset 
O={𝑜0, 𝑜1, … , 𝑜𝑙}, 
Outputs: Matrix Cost containing the costs of all strategies 
to all players 
 
1: Identify available strategies over the set O 
2: for each player  ch 
3:      for each strategy 
4:            for each value of the congestion vector 
5:                  compute the cost of the singleton 
strategy for the player using formula 
6:                  assign the cost to the matrix Cost   
7:            end for    
8:      end for  
9: end for  
 
Algorithm 4: Merging close clusters 
Inputs: set of initial clusters set C={𝑐0, 𝑐1, … , 𝑐𝑛0−1}, the 
number of the final clusters f  
Outputs: set of final clusters C 
 
1: compute the distance between all initial clusters  
2: repeat  
3:       merge the two closest clusters 
4: until the number of clusters is reached  
 
 
TABLE 1. DATASETS DESCRIPTION  
 
Datasets  Instances Attributes Clusters 
Synthetic datasets Spharical_3_4 400 3 4 {100, 100, 100, 100} 
Dataset_3_2 76 2 3 {13, 43, 20} 
Spiralsquare 1500 2 6 {116, 134, 125, 125, 500, 500} 
Real-world datasets Iris 150 4 3 {50, 50, 50} 
Wine 178 13 3 {59, 71, 48} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(A) Spherical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(B) Dataset_3_2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(C) Spiral square 
Fig. 1. Synthetic datasets, (a)Spharical_3_4 (b) Dataset_3_2 (c) Spiral square 
 
Step1:  Identification of the initial players 
This step aims at the identification of the players (cluster 
heads). The initial number of clusters is estimated using the 
formula: 
𝑛0 = 𝑚/ 𝐿            (9) 
Where m is the size of the dataset, and L is the number of 
neighbours used to find the connectivity of each cluster. The 
dissimilarity of each object is then compared to all other 
objects in the dataset, and it is computed as follows: 
𝑑𝑚(𝑜) =
1
𝑚−1
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑠[𝑜][𝑜𝑖]𝑜𝑖∈𝑂,𝑜𝑖≠𝑜              (10) 
Objects with the smallest dm values are the objects with 
the most density around them; consequently, they are 
chosen to be cluster-heads (or players). 
Step2: Establishment of initial clusters’ composition 
This step aims at determining the composition of the 
initial clusters by constructing the game described in 
formula (8). The players of the game are the objects with the 
highest density around them. This game is played several 
times until all objects are allocated or when no player wants 
to play again.  Algorithm 3 summarises this step. 
Step 3: Merging close clusters 
After having n0 initial clusters from step2, in this step, 
we perform a merging operation until we obtained very 
distinct clusters. First, the distance between each pair of the 
initial clusters is calculated, then, the most two closest 
clusters are merged within a reasonable distance based on 
compactness. 
IV. EXPERIMENTATIONS AND CLUSTERING VALIDATION 
A. Settings 
Experiments were conducted on 2.50GHz Intel ® Core ™ 
i5-3210M with 8 GB of RAM. All the algorithms were 
implemented in Java programming language. We compared our 
approach with well-known clustering algorithms. These include 
K-means, DBSCAN (density-based spatial clustering of 
applications with noise), and SOM (Self-organizing Map). 
The source code for those algorithms was taken from Java 
Machine Learning Library JavaML 
1
. 
The parameter L is the number of neighbours required to 
define the connectivity. This parameter depends on the size 
of the data and its dispersion. In the datasets used in our 
experiments, L is set to value 9 when the size of the dataset 
is less than 150; the value 14 when the size of the dataset is 
between 150 and 500; the value 28 when the dataset is 
bigger than 500.  The experiments were conducted on five 
datasets; three of them are synthetic: Spharical_3_4
2
, 
Dataset_3_2, and Spiral square
3
 (see Fig. 1), the other two are 
real-world: Iris
4
 and Wine
5
, which are well-known datasets for 
clustering evaluation (see TABLE 1). 
 
                                                 
1 http://java-ml.sourceforge.net/ 
2 Available at GitHub : https://github.com/deric/clustering-
benchmark/tree/b47cdbb7028a61d632e2c63901f868e99444b350 
3 Available at GitHub  : https://github.com/deric/clustering-
benchmark/tree/b47cdbb7028a61d632e2c63901f868e99444b350 
4 Available at UCI Machine Learning Repository. : 
ftp://ftp.ics.uci.edu/pub/machine-learning-databases  
5 Available at UCI Machine Learning Repository. : 
ftp://ftp.ics.uci.edu/pub/machine-learning-databases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Purity values resulted from various Algorithms on different datasets. 
A high value of purity indicates a better clustering result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Rand Index resulted from running various Algorithms on different 
datasets. A high value of Rand Index indicates a better clustering result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. F-measure resulted from running various Algorithms on different 
datasets. A high value of F-measure indicates a better clustering result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. ARI resulted from running various Algorithms on different datasets. 
A high value of ARI indicates a better clustering result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Precision resulted from running various Algorithms on different 
datasets. A high value of Precision indicates a better clustering result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Entropy resulted from running various Algorithms on different 
datasets. A low value of Entropy indicates a better clustering result. 
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In the aim of validating our approach, we use the following 
metrics:  
 Purity: purity is the percentage of the objects that were 
classified correctly:   
𝑃𝑗 =  
1
𝑛𝑗
 MAX𝑖(𝑛𝑗
𝑖)        (11) 
Where nj is the size of the cluster j, and 𝑛𝑗
𝑖 is the 
number of correctly assigned objects. The overall 
purity of a clustering is given by: 
𝑃 =  ∑
𝑛𝑗
𝑛
𝑘
𝑗=1 𝑃𝑗       (12)  
 Rand Index (RI): The Rand index measures the 
percentage of correct decisions. It is calculated as 
follows [20]: 
𝑅𝐼 =  
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃+𝐹𝑁+𝑇𝑁
      (13) 
Where TP is a true positive, TN is a true negative, 
FP is a false positive, and FN is a false negative.  
 Adjusted Rand Index:[21] is the corrected-for-
chance version of the Rand index, it is given by the 
following: 
𝐴𝑅𝐼 =
∑ (𝑛𝑙𝑘
2
) − [∑ (𝑛𝑙
2
) ∗ ∑ (𝑛𝑘
2
) 𝑘𝑙 ] (
𝑛
2
)⁄𝑙𝑘
 1
2
[∑ (𝑛𝑙
2
) ∗ ∑ (𝑛𝑘
2
) 𝑘𝑙 ] − [∑ (
𝑛𝑙
2
) ∗ ∑ (𝑛𝑘
2
) 𝑘𝑙 ] (
𝑛
2
)⁄  
 
(14) 
 F-measure: F-Measure provides a single score that 
balances both the concerns of precision and recall in 
one number, it is given by the formula [22]:   
𝐹𝑤 =  
(𝑊2+1)∗𝑃∗𝑅
𝑊2∗𝑃+𝑅
 ,    (15) 
𝐸𝑗 = −  
1
LOG 𝑘
 ∑
𝑛𝑗
𝑖
𝑛𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1  LOG
𝑛𝑗
𝑖
𝑛𝑗
    (16) 
Where k is the number of clusters in the dataset, w is a 
positive real value, P is the precision, and R is the 
recall. 
𝑃 =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃
    (17) 
 
𝑅 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
   (18) 
 Entropy: the entropy shows how the various classes of 
objects are distributed within each cluster [23]. It is 
given by the following formula: 
 
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦 =  ∑
𝑛𝑗
𝑛
𝐾
𝑗=1  𝐸𝑗     (19) 
Where Ej is the entropy of cluster j, it is given as follows: 
𝐸𝑗 = − 
1
log 𝑘
 ∑
𝑛𝑗
𝑖
𝑛𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1  log
𝑛𝑗
𝑖
𝑛𝑗
    (20) 
and k is the number of clusters in the dataset. 
B. Results and Discussion 
The experimental results indicate that our approach, 
MOCA-SM, obtains good results for all datasets overall (see 
Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig. 5, Fig. 6, and Fig. 7). One can 
notice that other approaches returned good results for some 
datasets and average results in others.  In the following we 
discuss the results of each dataset. 
(1) Spharical_3_4: for this dataset, our approach returned 
perfect clustering, as it is shown in the Figures above. 
While K-means gets noticeably average results, SOM 
gets the lowest results for this dataset in all evaluation 
metrics used. DBSCAN did very well too. 
(2) Dataset_3_2: Similar to the previous dataset, our 
approach and DBSCAN performed a perfect 
clustering, while K-means and SOM produced average 
quality clustering. This is for all the evaluation metrics 
used. 
(3) Spiral square: for this challenging synthetic dataset, 
all the four algorithms performed worse than on the 
first two datasets. Although k-means is slightly better 
than our approach, they both obtained better results in 
terms of cluster purity, Rand Index, and entropy than 
DBSCAN and SOM, which returned less than average 
results for this dataset. On the other hand, SOM 
obtained the higher precision and F-measure results, 
closely followed by our approach.   
(4) Iris: for this real-world dataset, our approach returned 
the best results in all evaluation metrics, closely 
followed by k-means, then DBSCAN and SOM. 
Overall, these four approaches high quality results for 
this dataset.  
(5) Wine: for this dataset, SOM got higher results, closely 
followed by our approach for all metrics except for the 
precision where k-means takes the lead. The DBSCAN 
results were not taken into account because it 
eliminated 80% of the dataset points considering them 
as noise.  
 
The results of this comparative study for each dataset 
and metric are presented in Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig. 5, Fig. 
6, and Fig. 7. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we presented congestion games with 
player-specific functions that model a clustering problem 
into a game. The use of game theory tools provides a solid 
mathematical background of the proposed solution. This 
allows us to understand how the clustering is done and the 
results can be easily interpreted. In addition, the propose 
approach returned very good clustering results, as shown in 
the previous section on various datasets and metrics.  
The proposed approach consists of three main phases: in 
the first phase we identify the players over a set of objects or 
data points, which are considered as the centres of the 
clusters. In the second phase, each player aims to improve 
their gains in terms of connectivity and R-square. Each 
player (or cluster-head) plays and attempts to reach Nash 
equilibrium. In the third phase, when all players stop playing, 
the merging starts. Two clusters are merged if they are very 
close to each other.   
Much further work is needed, especially in the 3
rd
 phase 
to give our approach the ability of automatically deciding on 
the number of the final clusters.  
Although the scalability of the approach has not been 
presented in this paper, some preliminary tests have been 
conducted and the results very promising in this matter. As 
continuation of this work, we will study its complexity and 
effectiveness in details on heterogeneous datasets in terms of 
quality, noise and outliers. Moreover, we will extend the 
approach to categorical attributes and compare it to the best 
algorithms for that category of attributes [24]. 
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